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Abstract:
“What  is  appreciation?”  is  a  basic  question  in  the  philosophy  of  art,  and  the
analogy between appreciating a work of art and getting a joke can help us answer
it.  We first  propose a subjective account of  aesthetic appreciation (I).  Then we
consider jokes (II). The difference between getting a joke and not, or what it is to
get  it  right,  can  often  be  objectively  articulated.  Such  explanations  cannot
substitute for the joke itself, and indeed may undermine the very power of the joke
to evoke an appropriate response. Sometimes the discourse of art critics can have
a  similar  effect.  We  therefore  explore  the  analogy  between  getting  jokes  and
appreciating works of  art  (III),  and find it  unexpectedly strong.  Finally  (IV),  we
consider Wittgensteinian grounds for thinking as we do, considering the language
game of joke-telling, the relevance of seeing aspects, and giving reasons.
                  
 “The question, ‘what is the nature of a joke?’ is like the question, ‘what is the
nature of a lyric poem?’” [1]
Philosophers have a reputation for wit, but not all of us indulge. A. C. Ewing, for
instance, was much given to seriousness. He has been described as “a drab little
man”. At Cambridge, one student recalls, “he would talk for a bit, and then say ‘I
will now dictate’. …He always had a worked-out answer to everything.” [2] Ewing
“was deeply religious and serious. A. J. Ayer [who was of course a wit] ribbed him
about his belief in the afterlife, demanding to know what he most looked forward to
in the next world. Ewing replied immediately, ‘God will tell me whether there are
synthetic a priori propositions.’” That is not a joke. It is just a story. This is not
changed by the fact that we might even see Ayer as the straight man in the story,
Æ - Getting It: on jokes and art http://www.uqtr.ca/AE/Vol_10/wittgenstein/burns.htm
1 of 17 10-04-07 8:41 PM
and Ewing as the wit. He did, after all, manage to suggest that he was not likely to
learn  the  answer  from  Ayer.  One  is  lead  to  suspect,  however,  that  that  was
inadvertent. Anecdotes of this sort can be close cousins of the sort of mock story
invented for a  laugh that  we call  a  joke.  Our aim in this  paper is  to direct  the
reader’s  attention to  the  latter,  and to  compare  the  appreciation of  jokes  to  the
appreciation of works of art.
The late Derek Jarman, in his film, Wittgenstein, invents a death-bed scene in which
Wittgenstein  tells  his  friend,  Maynard  Keynes,  that  he  once  conceived  of  a
philosophy written entirely in jokes. [3] “Why did you not write it?” asks Keynes.
Wittgenstein  deadpans,  “I  didn’t  have  a  sense  of  humour.”  He  certainly  had
aesthetic taste, however, and we think that the two are richly analogous. We shall
begin by discussing aesthetic appreciation.
Wittgenstein’s analogy between jokes and art is the horizon against which we are
sketching. It is no accident that it is in a paper on jokes that Ted Cohen identifies an
account of aesthetic appreciation is an “absolutely basic question in the philosophy
of art”. [4] In §I we focus on a paper by John Findlay, which argues, convincingly if
one-sidedly, that this “absolutely basic” question in aesthetics is answered when we
have  an  account  of  aesthetic  experience  as  one  “uniquely  marked  out  and
extraordinary in its delight”. [5] We argue that he was wrong, however, to discount
entirely the relevance of the object being experienced. We develop an account of
appreciation that is based on Findlay’s view. We then discuss the parallel case (§II),
the relation between jokes and laughter. The difference between getting a joke and
not—missing the point—can be articulated.  Such explanations have the form of
giving reasons for seeing the joke one way rather than others. It is usually claimed,
however,  that such explanations cannot substitute for the joke itself,  and indeed
undermine  the  very  power  of  the  joke  to  evoke  an  appropriate  response.  We
challenge this view. We then (III) explore the intersection of those two discussions,
maintaining that  several  features of  the appreciation of  jokes are relevant  to  an
analysis  of  appreciation  of  artworks.  We  conclude  (IV)  with  a  section  on  the
Wittgensteinian  foundations  of  our  analysis,  considering  the  language  game  of
joke-telling, the relevance of seeing aspects, and the matter of giving reasons.
I.  Appreciation
The  natural  place  to  begin  an  analysis  of  aesthetic  appreciation  is  with  the
observer’s subjective states. One could start with the artist’s imagination, and seek
to show that  to  appreciate  art  is  to  get  that  straight.  The viewer,  that  is,  really
appreciates the work if she gets herself into the frame of mind that the artist had
when conceiving the work. Or one could start with the physical work of art itself,
and claim that getting its objective properties right is the essence of appreciation.
The  latter  is  a  classically  cognitivist  view,  and  the  former  can  be  called  an
expressivist  one.  John  Findlay’s  view  can  be  contrasted  with  those  familiar
cognitivist and expressivist stances. [6] Cognitivists emphasize objective features of
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the work of art, or public features of the language of interpretation, which assure the
work a cognitive content whether or not an individual observer, or even the artist
herself, assesses correctly what that content is. Ideally, of course, such content is
communicated from artist  to observer.  Appreciation from this starting point is a
case of getting it right. Expressivists, too, are concerned with communication, but
in the first instance they conceive the art work as the artist’s attempt at expressing
her  feelings,  emotions  or  experiences.  Here,  too,  getting  it  right  is  essential  to
appreciation, though in this case it is a matter of feeling what the artist was feeling.
Findlay’s  view,  in  contrast,  is  scarcely  concerned  with  communication  at  all.
Getting it is not about being right about the artist or the object. Findlay begins with
the experience of the observer regardless of what causes it.
Findlay  attacks  philosophical  aesthetics  as  practiced  in  English  in  the  decades
immediately  after  World  War II.  He calls  it  “as  theme less,  as  structureless,  as
unprincipled, as devoid of backbone and as trivial and unmemorable as the material
they think it deals with.” [7] [Think of that as a case of insult as wit.] He, on the
other  hand,  takes  art  and  aesthetic  experience  to  be  none  of  the  above,  and
embraces “the quest for unity and generality in which philosophy consists” (ibid.).
He maintains that “aesthetic consciousness is just consciousness in its purest form”
(102), and from this derives the claim that our tendency to seek perspicuity and
poignancy in experience,  rather than to cultivate the obscure and the humdrum,
springs necessarily from our nature as essentially conscious beings. This appears to
be a subjectivist view, because of its focus on the nature of the subject’s conscious
experience, but Findlay makes important qualifications.
Of his own aesthetic experiences, Findlay says that they “are for me of agonizing
importance,  and  I  suffer  recurrently  form  a  sort  of  aesthetic  impotence  or
insensibility which I rate as the most depriving and the most readily fallen into of
all forms of impotence.” But he continues,
So far am I from holding that there is no such specific thing as an aesthetic
experience, that it is just any experience in a special context, that I think it a
type of experience uniquely marked out, extraordinary in its delight, and often
in its difficulty and pain, but above all an experience that is not always nor
readily  to  be  had,  that  it  involves  the  concentration,  the  mental
undistractedness,  even  the  bodily  euphoria  and  lightness  that  we  too  often
cannot muster at all. (89-90)
An  important  and  popular  view  of  aesthetic  appreciation—one  that  is
subjectivist—is thus set aside. It is the view that an object has been aesthetically
appreciated when an observer has had “just any experience” in its presence. “I like
it because it makes me feel sad or hopeful, makes me think of my grandmother or
of canoeing the Mersey River….” To appreciate, on this view, is to like,  and in
particular  to like because of  an awakened emotion or association.  Such a view,
although popular, is easily undermined. The observer’s reaction may not be to the
work itself, or to relevant aspects of it, it may not respond to any of the artist’s
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intentions (who may have had courage in mind rather than sadness, e.g.), or may be
an eccentric, personal association with an actual feature of the work that is not a
relevant  part  of  the work,  itself  (that  it  was playing when my car  went  off  the
road—so  reminds  me  of  fear).  This  sort  of  experience  is  an  experience,  sure
enough,  and one in  an  aesthetic  context.  But  it  is  not,  just  because  of  that,  an
aesthetic experience.
Objections  such  as  these  are  built  on  notions  of  relevance:  the  experience  that
counts as an aesthetic  response must  be responding to a relevant  feature of  the
work, or to something intended by the artist, or to something that is in the work in
such a way that other observers of similar cultural background may be expected to
“get it”. Findlay’s objection is based on none of the above. His first claim is that the
aesthetic experience is a unique one and in some sense the same for everyone. He
bases  this  on  a  second  claim,  that  the  nature  of  aesthetic  appreciation  can  be
systematically  derived  from prior  philosophical  commitments.  This  point  needs
examination. Findlay is not interested in the mere variety of empirical phenomena.
What he would like to propound is a theory which derives aesthetic experience
from the concept of being, but he will content himself here with deriving it from the
concept  of  consciousness.  To  this  end  he  begins  with  “Brentano’s  masterly
ground-plan of mental life” (94), which divides the conscious mind into three basic
species: mere conception (having something present to one); theoretical acceptance
(of something as true, existent or believable); and practical acceptance (which is
present in our feelings, desires and practical decisions). The value of this scheme,
thinks Findlay, is that it properly locates the aesthetic field—“it is one of suspended
conception,  a  pure  having  something  before  one  for  contemplation”  (ibid.).
Appreciation, that is, is not a matter of figuring something out. Aesthetic attitudes,
therefore, are present wherever there is consciousness, they are consciousness at its
purest  –  highly  to  be  welcomed,  and  easy  to  be  distracted  from  by  concerns
practical or theoretical.
Findlay thus claims to have located, despite all the diversity of aesthetic experience,
the simple, common nature of it. However, he does not express much interest in the
fact that the experiences in question will still differ from case to case. This seems to
us  to  be  an  important  omission.  Consider  the  testimony  of  the  late  Richard
Wollheim, who has left us a description of his own method of looking at paintings:
I evolved a way of looking at paintings which was massively time consuming
and deeply rewarding. For I came to recognise that it often took the first hour
or so in front of a painting for stray associations or motivated misperceptions
to settle down, and it was only then, with the same amount of time or more to
spend looking at it, that the picture could be relied upon to disclose itself as it
was. I noticed that I became an object of suspicion to passers-by, and so did
the picture that I was looking at. [8]
This  is  first  of  all  Findlayan;  consider  the  time  taken,  the  need  to  remove
distractions, the achievement of a state of appreciation that no doubt includes some
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of “the concentration …even the bodily euphoria and lightness that we too often
cannot  muster  at  all”  (Findlay,  90).  Wollheim  reminds  us,  however,  that
appreciation is more than just having an experience of this sort, however unique
and  extraordinary  the  experience  may  be;  in  particular,  it  requires  that  the
experience be connected in some appropriate way with the object in question, and
thus that it differ from object to object. Having such an aesthetic experience while
hearing,  for  instance,  Heinz  Holliger  play  Luciano  Berio’s  Sequenza  for  Oboe,
might involve appreciating the performer’s anguished attempt to express himself on
a recalcitrant instrument. [9] This would seem to be a quite different experience
from appreciating the salmon-coloured beauty of a Maritime sunset. In the latter
case we would be happy to say that the sunset’s bringing peace to the end of a
troubled day would not count as essential to aesthetic appreciation. Response to the
sensuous beauty alone, or to a painter’s capturing of it,  would suffice, while its
relation to the troubles of the day would surely fall into one of Brentano’s other
categories (presumably the pragmatic one). Of the oboe solo, on the other hand,
part  of  experiencing  the  piece  would  be  seeing  the  performer  dismantle  his
instrument, play on the mouthpiece alone, and then as though gasping for breath
play with just the reeds dipped into the glass of water that is part of the oboist’s
accoutrement.  This  is  what  we  described  as  striving  to  express  himself  on  a
recalcitrant instrument. To mistake the anguish for mere hard work would be to
miss an aspect of the work itself, or at least of this performance of it.
Appreciation in this sense is of course a complex term. It is, we have claimed, a
special,  detached  state  of  contemplative  consciousness,  but  one  with  some
appropriate cognizance of the work being contemplated. Simply reacting to a work,
and liking it, is insufficient. “Getting it right” on the other hand is also not required.
This constraint, that the experience should to some degree respond to the object of
attention, tends to make appreciation seem like judgement; this tendency needs to
be restrained before we turn Findlay back into a  cognitivist.  One must  know a
certain amount about what it is that one is confronting in order to have the aesthetic
experience properly associated with it, but “appreciate” does not mean “make the
correct  value  judgement  about  the  object”.  Findlay’s  cat  is  not  up to  that.  [10]
Appreciation  should  not  be  confused  with  critical  judgement  any  more  than  it
should be confused with “just any experience” of merely subjective status.
Of greatest importance for Findlay is the receptiveness of the consciousness. We do
not say “passivity” (although agency or activity is primarily confined to Brentano’s
theoretical  and  practical  forms  of  consciousness);  there  is  activity  in  the
preparations for receptivity. Remember the time that Wolheim takes in front of a
painting. Similarly, one does not fall asleep by making an effort to fall asleep, but
one  does  typically  prepare  mind  and  body  for  rest,  putting  aside  the  dirt  and
clothing and troubles of the day, finding a dark and quiet place to lie down, and so
on. Perhaps falling asleep is something that happens to one rather than something
that one does, but it is not usually adventitious, unwilled, or totally passive. These
characteristics  are  shared  with  Findlay’s  aesthetic  appreciator.  Let  us  now hold
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aesthetic  appreciation  in  the  background  while  we  consider  the  matter  of
appreciating a joke.
II. Laughter
Serving as an analogy for aesthetic appreciation, and also oddly paralleled by the
analogy with falling asleep, is the getting of a joke. A joke is of course not the only
sign of a sense of humour; getting a joke is a fairly limited, if mundane, example of
humour.  Nonetheless,  the  laugh  at  the  punch-line  of  a  decently-told  story  is
something that happens to a person. It is not something that can be actively done,
but it, too, is not purely adventitious, unwilled, or passive. We do not consciously
decide to laugh any more than we do to have an aesthetic experience, but typically
one prepares oneself for a joke. There are clues that one is coming: a sermon or an
after-dinner  speech  is  beginning,  co-workers  are  on  a  break  and  in  a  mood  to
entertain  one  another,  a  volunteer  steps  forward  to  try  to  break  an  oppressive
tension, a boss intends to make an impression on vulnerable employees, and so on.
“Did you hear the one about…?” is a dead giveaway, of course, but there are subtler
clues that a story is beginning – a hesitation, shift in tone, a sudden seriousness, and
so on. Thus, the listener is typically aware that a joke is underway. (Humour which
does not prepare the listener is of a drier sort, and the reaction is usually slower in
coming, if it comes at all. We confine ourselves here to the common, well-signalled
joke.)
A weak example will be sufficient for our purposes: An earnest parish priest and an
alcoholic bus-driver approach the Pearly Gates together. St. Peter welcomes them,
then assigns the bus-driver an eternal home in a stately mansion and the priest a
place in a run-down rooming-house. “There must be some mistake”, protests the
priest.  “Not  at  all”,  explains  St.  Peter.  “Consider  your  lives.  Whenever  people
listened to one of your sermons they fell asleep. Whenever people rode on his bus
they started to pray.”
A standard account of the laugh is that, like the sneeze or the orgasm it is a release
of tension. There may not seem to be much reason why anyone who laughed at that
joke should have been particularly tense, however. Another is that it takes delight in
aggression. [11] Here the victim would be the priest, but victimization seems low
on the list of things that might be keys to the joke. A third standard account is that
the laugh is triggered by surprise. [12] That seems to work better, at least in this sort
of  case.  Clearly  there  is  an  easy expectation that  a  priest  should  receive  better
treatment in an afterlife than a reprobate. That expectation is contradicted by our
story.  That  however  is  not  the  key  surprise  –  it  just  establishes  that  there  is
something needing explaining. Indeed, it is really a surprise that functions to set up
a  tension;  we  need  to  preserve  an  assumption  that  has  surprisingly  been
controverted in the set-up of the joke. Tension and surprise seem to us not to be
incompatible  features  of  the  getting of  a  joke.  It  has  to  be noted that  a  simple
explanation of this joke would not suffice: if St. Peter had explained his decision by
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pointing  out  that  the  priest  had  fornicated  with  gullible  parishioners  while  the
bus-driver had conducted inspiring prayer meetings, we would have understood his
decision, but would not have had a joke. For one thing, the priest’s well-intentioned
protest  would  have  been  insufficiently  motivated.  For  another,  no  matter  how
unexpected the explanation it would not be sufficiently outside the realm of what
the listener thought possible to trigger the required surprise.
The surprise in this case is  of several  kinds:  that  a priest  is  less honoured in a
religious context than a bus-driver; that a professional man is less honoured in a
more global context than a blue-collar worker; that a job conscientiously done is
less honoured than one performed while inebriated – the priest’s dismay is thus
fully explained, indeed it is over-determined. The punch-line, however, still brings a
twist. In fact it is a further twist which reestablishes our pre-joke harmony. There
was tension after all. It was created by the anomalies in the story itself. And if we
insist on looking for surprise, then there are two surprises needed. Whether the key
is thought to be tension, aggression or surprise, we are inclined to think that no such
simple schematism will give the essential theory of the laugh. Jokes, after all, show
considerable variety.
Clerics often tell such anti-clerical jokes about themselves. They do so not only in a
desperate attempt to keep a congregation awake, but often also in recognition that
their priestly purpose is to induce religious attitudes rather than unconsciousness.
We think that there is a third surprise in our example. Perhaps the keenest twist of
the joke, is that despite reinforcing stereotypical Roman Catholic mythology and
theory (about saints and heaven, e.g.), it is essentially anti-Catholic, an inversion of
religious values; it asserts that Catholicism cares not how or why a person prays, as
long as  he  prays!  Praying to  get  off  a  bus  alive  cannot  in  good conscience be
compared to praying for forgiveness of sins so that one can face the last judgement
with an open heart. Praying out of temporary mortal fear rather than out of eternal
love also demeans the institution. So by a bit of quasi-theology, an anti-religious
association of prayer with the bus-driver rather than with the priest completes the
bitter twist that makes the joke a joke.
The joke is not only bitter, however, but also hopeful. One of the highlights of Ted
Cohen’s  paper  on  jokes  is  his  discussion  of  the  way  both  teller  and  laugher
reinforce some sense of community, whether a closed one of in-group knowledge or
of  shared  beliefs  and  feelings,  or  a  general  one  of  common  humanity.  In  our
example,  besides the shared knowledge of rudimentary eschatology, there is  the
shared hope that we in our human imperfection may also yet be saved. As Cohen
concludes, “Anything which can show us that aspect of ourselves deserves fond and
serious attention.” [13]
We have gone on at length about that one poor story partly to indicate how much
common understanding is presupposed among those who “get the joke”, but also to
corner the person who does not get it. [We leave aside here the listener who gets it,
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all right, but does not think it funny; that is a different sort of problem.] To get the
joke, not only must a person know a minimum about priests and bus-drivers, and
about rewards in the afterlife, but must also understand that getting people to pray,
in this scheme of things, is rewarded, boring them to sleep is not. Moreover, having
been told that sermons achieved the latter the listener must also be quick enough to
see  that  dangerous  driving  achieved  the  former.  Assuming  suitable  background
knowledge, the step likely to be missed is the last. “It was his drunk driving that
made them pray”, is probably the needed explanation in that case. That would likely
evoke a  subdued,  “Oh,  I  get  it.”  The recognition would come too late  and too
predictably  to  produce  a  laugh,  which  would  be  further  suppressed  by  the
embarrassment of having had to have the joke explained.
Someone might half-get the joke, and laugh anyway. Should he then say, “Funny
that all the people who wanted to pray took the bus instead of going to church,
eh?”, we should think that his laughing was at best half-way justified, and that he
had not really got the main point of the joke. Of course in such situations it is better
to let sleeping dogs lie, and just to change the subject, but one might press on with a
modest,  “I  think  it  was  because  he  was  a  drunk  bus-driver  that  his  passengers
resorted to prayer.” Although our victim might reply, “Then I don’t see why it’s
funny”, which could set off yet another round of explanations, there is a strong case
for thinking that there is a right way to read the joke, and quite enough ways to
show what is the right way, for there to be pretty general agreement about it. This
idea, that there is a single point, and only one way of getting it, can, however, be
exaggerated. The person who laughs at the discomfiture of the priest and the person
who laughs at the luck of the bus driver, both get the joke, and neither need think of
the pseudo-theology involved, let alone feel the community of human wit, to be
said to have gotten it.
Here  it  may  be  appropriate  to  consider  the  oddness  of  human  laughter.
Wittgenstein offers this observation:
Two people are laughing together, say at a joke. One of them has used certain
somewhat unusual words and now they both break out into a sort of bleating.
That might appear very extraordinary to a visitor coming from quite a different
environment. Whereas we find it completely reasonable.
  (I recently witnessed this scene on a bus and was able to think myself into
position of someone to whom this would be unfamiliar.  From that point of
view  it  struck  me  as  quite  irrational,  like  the  responses  of  an  outlandish
animal.) [14]
It  can  strike  empirical  scientists  that  way,  too.  A neuro-embryologist,  Robert
Provine, has claimed that laughter is not a response to punch lines, but to social
bonding  cues.  It  is  of  course  related  to  primitive  tickle  reflexes  and  primate
playfulness, but he claims that when the conversations of groups of laughing people
were  recorded  and  analyzed,  “only  around  15  per  cent  of  the  sentences  that
triggered laughter were traditionally humorous.” [15] Clearly people do sometimes
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laugh at things that are not funny and do so for social reasons (to be included in the
group, because the boss told the joke); similarly people sometimes do not laugh at
things  that  are  funny  and  do  so  for  social  reasons  (embarrassment,  moral
objections).  Normally,  however,  we do not  laugh at  things we find unfunny,  as
many a would-be comic can testify. To see human laughter as like the responses of
an outlandish animal is a bizarre way to try to understand it.
It  was  our  initial  purpose  to  explore  the  analogy  between  getting  a  joke  and
appreciating an art work. How, some listeners will want to ask, can anything similar
to what we have just  said about jokes be said about appreciating works of art?
Surely there are myriad ways of appreciating an artwork, and no such thing as “the
right way”. Getting a joke is a matter of some precision, and did we not end our §I
with the claim that art does not need to be got exactly right to be appreciated? We
have been taking some care to reduce the starkness of this apparent contrast. If we
keep in mind our Findlayan starting point, treating the subjective “getting it” as
having priority over the objective “getting it right”, the analogy can be drawn even
more closely and more fruitfully.
III. Punch-line
Ted Cohen, suggests several similarities between jokes and art. One, which we have
mentioned above, derives from their common ability to bring us out of ourselves, to
reinforce our shared feelings, our shared humanity, our shared capacity for feelings.
Even Findlay’s subjective starting point is a fundamental capacity shared with all
other conscious beings—that would include many humans. Exercising this capacity
reinforces that common humanity. A second is that some jokes, like ethnic jokes
and sequence jokes (lightbulb jokes, “what do you call someone…?” jokes [16] ),
are importantly members of a genus, and gain force from being seen as instances of
a type. (This can be seen in the way that Russell and Art, in the footnote above, are
funnier when Bill  and Bob have been established. The former exploit  the given
framework, and change its rules slightly at the same time.) Cohen says: “This seems
to  me  exactly  how  it  is  with  art  forms.  The  form  itself  induces  particular
expectations and forms of attention, and then the individual work moves with or
against  them.  The  work  cannot  get  to  you  unless  you  can  see  it  in  its  frame”
(Cohen, “Jokes”, 138). [This works in a Findlayan way: the conscious attention has
priority, then the framing assumptions, and lastly the details of the work.] Thirdly,
as in works of art, “in a very good joke every element…has a point” (ibid.). That is,
each of its elements can be accounted for in connection with explaining the joke /
art work. Jokes with random details are not as good, or not as well told. It is similar
with works of art and their explanations. A fourth point in common is that they do
not have discursive equivalents—we have to get the effect from the object itself,
rather than from an explanation of it. This helps to account for the importance of
originality in art and freshness in jokes. It is worth remarking, however, that in both
cases the explanation is given in words. Words can be no substitute for a painting,
but  in  the  case  of  the  joke  both  it  and  the  explanation  are  discursive.  The
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explanation is a sort of substitute; because it is in words it is like a badly-told joke.
That  is  one  reason  why  it  lets  you  down;  it  kills  the  laugh,  while  the  prose
explanation of a painting turns you back to the painting. We shall  return to the
matter of explanations in a moment.
We first  want  to point  to a  fifth common feature of  the art-appreciator  and the
joke-getter:  one  that  can  be  called  humility.  There  is  humility  required  of  the
joke-hearer: that she awaits with patience being manipulated (wound up and then
released), or at least surprised – while also being threatened with “not getting the
point”. She must, that is, set aside certain normal preoccupations of the self: some
of  its  task-orientedness,  some of  its  self-confidence,  and  above  all  some of  its
autonomy. The joke-hearer wills herself heteronymous; she will let herself be taken
over for a few moments by the story-teller, and will allow him to try to bring her to
laughter. This requires, as Findlay pointed out, a state of self-suppression, in which
the ego’s practical and theoretical demands are set aside, in which the self,  like
water, seeks the lowest ground, and awaits with heightened awareness the coming
of the revelation. This phenomenon has a great deal in common with what Findlay
identifies as aesthetic experience. [It also invites political comment, which we set
aside at this time.]
There are, of course, important differences: an obvious one is that, except when
being entertained by a stand-up comic, people often take turns telling jokes. This
reciprocity alleviates the stigma of heteronomy, without in any way eliminating the
necessity of it. Another obvious difference is that the laugh is sudden and relatively
brief,  while  the  aesthetic  experience  can  dawn  gradually  and  persist.  The
physiology is  appropriately very different.  The laugh shakes the body; aesthetic
absorption is a “zestful, purring meditation”. The biggest problem, however, with
our claim that the analogy is a close one is the inclination to think that jokes and art
differ because explanation ruins a joke and assists with the appreciation of art. This
objection, we think, is not entirely justified. It is true that there are no joke critics
writing columns for The Globe. Cohen, however, argues that this is a function of the
simplicity of many jokes. More elaborate ones, with deep sources and the potential
to survive retelling, are not always obliterated by analysis. “If a joke or an art work
can  be  truly  effective  only  once,  then  it  is  smothered  by  its  exegesis.  The
explanation seems to usurp the one chance the work had. But if the work has a
multiple capacity, then exegesis can even be invigorating” (131, our emphasis). [17]
One measure of this is that even when a joke is successfully told, discussion about
its wit and structure can lead the teller to think more highly of the joke, to tell it
better next time and laugh more heartily along with her hearers.
This brings us to our final observation about the analogy between jokes and art. It is
a popular view of art that its “multiple capacity” is not just that a good work of art
rewards  repeated  observings,  but  that  it  sustains  multiple  and  incompatible  but
equally justified interpretations.  In this,  of course,  a work of art  would be very
unlike a joke, which usually forces very clear agreement about what its point is.
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The  matter  of  multiple  interpretations  of  a  single  work  is  no  small  topic.  We
promised to  take Wittgenstein seriously in  this  paper.  His  discussion of  seeing-
aspects in Part II.xi of Philosophical Investigations offers a preliminary idea. The
“duck-rabbit”  is  a  figure  that  sustains  two  in  some  sense  incompatible
interpretations.  Hamlet,  being much more complex,  ought  to  sustain very many
more, goes the standard reading. The duck-rabbit, however, becomes less, not more,
ambiguous as we add feathers or fur, feet or tail. Similarly, we should expect that
the  more  complex  a  painting  or  a  play,  the  more  decidable  it  will  be  which
interpretations are more powerful, explain more features of the work, do so with
more plausibility, unity or simplicity, and so on. [18] We need not insist that there is
a best  interpretation,  but  the  richer  and more interpretable  a  work is,  the  more
potential  there  is  for  differentiating  between  better  and  worse  interpretations.
Similarly, there are degrees of getting a joke, and one can get it without getting it
perfectly. Sometimes people can laugh at different things in a joke without it having
to be the case that one of them does not get it. This leaves the analogy with the
elaborate  joke  much  closer  and  richer  than  at  first  appeared.  There  can  be
ambiguities in both art and humour. Yet both the artist and the teller of a joke must
draw  the  audience  into  a  funnel.  Background  assumptions  must  be  engaged,
agreement  in  judgements  must  be  assumed,  the  audience’s  attention  must  be
focused or compressed, and ultimately the audience must be led to see matters in a
quite specific way in order to get the point.
Those are our proposals about the usefulness of the analogy between jokes and art.
Nonetheless, our analysis is incomplete. We used Findlay as a starting point, but
then diverged from him. We shall end with Wittgenstein, and some remarks on how
he has guided our thinking. Getting to Wittgenstein from Findlay requires some
acknowledgment that Findlay thought Wittgenstein a mere empiricist who gathered
minutiae but could not see their unity, a man whose concept of family resemblances
was not itself a family-resemblance concept but one with an a priori unity of its
own—proof  that  the  only  sameness  that  is  of  interest  to  philosophers  is  an
essentialist, conceptual sameness. [19] We do not accept those theses of Findlay.
We needed him to help locate appreciation in the first place, but we do not stop
there.
IV. Explaining the joke
Wittgenstein advises his reader to “[r]eview the multiplicity of language-games in
the following examples, and in others:…Making a joke; telling it—.” [20] Taking
his advice has given us some insight into the practice of telling and sharing jokes.
First of all, jokes are intentionally made; while something I say may be accidentally
funny or strike my audience as comical,  it  does not seem right to call it  a joke
unless I intend it in some particular way. I can accidentally be a joke to someone,
but telling a joke is not something that accidentally happens to me. I mean it. This
intention involves certain visible/audible changes in my behaviour; we discussed
some  of  them  in  §II,  above.  A  well-told  joke  is  a  performance,  a  kind  of
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ceremony—even if  a joke-ceremony sometimes depends on the appearance of a
casual  straight  face  (deadpan).  We  understand  certain  rules  or  guidelines  for  a
well-performed  joke,  even  if  these  guidelines  are  themselves  open,  or  flexible.
These  rules  are  present  even  when  the  joke  works  against  them.  (“How many
feminists does it take to screw in a lightbulb? – That’s not funny!” This is a joke
that makes fun of the very form of the lightbulb joke. It also implies that feminists
are prone to seeing ‘innocent’ jokes as instruments of oppression, so that this joke is
an example of the very oppression it tries to make fun of). In the 1960s, Frank
Stella sometimes used shaped canvases to contain the restless arcs which were the
subject matter of his “Protractor Series” paintings; this exemplifies the sort of work
that  “moves  against  its  frame”,  in  this  case  challenging  the  expectation  of  a
rectangular canvas. Nor can I tell a joke without the co-operation of my audience. A
joke is at least a two-person language game (although one person can, on occasion,
play  both  parts),  and  both  parties  are  active.  When  Wayne  used  Schuster  as  a
straight-man, the audience was the active third party. We introduced the humility of
the audience in §III. The audience agrees to surrender in a certain way: to be held in
the spell of the person telling a joke, and to accept the suspension of disbelief that
jokes often require (everything from animals walking into bars, to conversations
taking place at the Pearly Gates).
What kind of a language game is joking? It behaves like an information-sharing
game, in which the hearer is told something that she did not know before. In other
words, there is the expectation of surprise and then fulfilment, just as if I discover
something from someone, or am taught it. But a joke-game is not exactly like an
information-sharing game. [21] One reason for this is that the humour of the joke
depends on shared knowledge. In a sense, the hearer has to be already familiar with
all  the  appropriate  elements  of  the  joke  to  get  it  properly.  This  leads  to  many
misunderstandings when jokes are told across cultures, or in unfamiliar contexts.
But if all the information is already known, what is shared when a joke is well told?
Certainly we experience it as gaining something, or at least as a shift in perception.
It is not just the reorganization of knowledge, or the forging of a new (and unusual)
connection between two previously unconnected pieces of knowledge. Not every
new connection is  funny.  The way the elements are linked is  subject  to certain
constraints;  they  have  to  obey  certain  rules,  and  these  rules  are  implicitly
acknowledged by those who take on a joke language-game. In our example above,
the story creates a tension (the drunk is in a mansion, the priest in a hovel), and then
releases it. [22] In fact it is complicity in betraying the information-sharing game
that helps make a joke work. There is a shift to a different game that is recognized
by both teller and audience, and part of the fun comes from the way it is parasitic
on  the  assumptions  of  information-sharing,  and  we  are  co-conspirators  in
pretending to play one game when we are really playing another. Within jokes, too,
there are often two language-games at work. If heavenly rewards for earthly virtue
are discussed in one language game, then cynical discussion of worldly rewards for
earthly  vices  takes  place  in  another;  our  sample  joke  switches  between  them,
creating a shift of aspect that takes the listener by surprise and forces an abrupt
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change of interpretation. [23]
If a joke succeeds or fails, this success or failure can belong either to the teller or to
the hearer or to some other factor. Consider failure: the teller could fail to perform
well, by messing up the punch line, by missing an element or including irrelevant
ones, or by failing to enact appropriate joking behaviour (appropriate pauses, raised
eyebrows, a serious manner, the grin of a punch-line,). Her audience may also fail,
by missing the joke (we discussed a case in §II), but there can also be some other
factor missing, which does not immediately seem to belong to either party. We want
to describe this as a shared horizon; it involves a sense of significance, meaning or
the order of how things are in the world that both people have. In other words, to
imagine a joke properly told is “to imagine a form of life” (§19).  [24] What is
necessary to  be able  to  play a  joking language-game? In other  words,  what  do
people need to share, or what does a language need to have available to it so that it
has  the  resources  for  joking?  Consider  the  builders  in  the  first  part  of  the
Philosophical Investigations. They have only a few words, block, pillar, slab, beam,
and at  first  we are  told  that  their  calls,  as  a  kind of  order,  are  conceived as  a
“complete primitive language”. But it would not take very much tinkering for this
language to produce a couple of rudimentary, if adolescent, jokes. [25] One builder
might point to a slab and, with a wink, call out “block” to his bewildered assistant,
repeatedly. Three Stooges comedies have been designed with less. Or, even more
plausibly, a friendly conspiracy might develop between some seasoned builders and
‘the new guy’, so that they tell him that slabs are really beams. Here the joking
quality of the communication seems to develop out of a kind of behaviour, and also
out of being included or excluded from a group. [26] This phenomenon can lead not
only to misunderstanding, but also to the exposure of prejudices and to jokes that
are  morally  or  politically  offensive.  [27]  Similar  features  of  a  work  of  art  can
distract  a  viewer  from  appreciating  it;  she  can  be  dragged  into  what  Findlay
identified as the ‘impotence’ of allowing practical or theoretical concerns reoccupy
her consciousness. Then she cannot achieve the essential contemplative euphoria;
similarly she may not be able to find a sexist joke funny. We believe that there are
times when she is right about this, times when the joke is not funny, times when
morality trumps aesthetics.  But that would require discussing the intersection of
major language games—a topic for another time.
A laugh is intensified by its own anticipation; the punch line is both expected and
not-expected.  Indeed,  the  hearer  expects  that  it  will  be  unexpected,  and  takes
pleasure in the particular way this expectation of surprise is fulfilled. There is a
parallel  in  art  appreciation,  perhaps most  obviously in the short  story,  the most
single-minded of literary forms. Edgar Allan Poe claimed that a story’s aim is “to
create ‘an effect’—by which Poe meant something almost physical, like…a frisson.
Every word in a story, Poe said, is in the service of this effect…. The reader of a
story expects an effect, and expects to be surprised by it, too.” [28] There is both
openness and rigidity to this fulfilment, whether in art or joke, which creates a kind
of satisfaction itself.
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What  is  this  satisfaction?  In  joking,  one  possibility  is  the  sheer  pleasure  of
demonstrating a mastery of language, of being able to communicate unexpected
meanings to someone else, especially when we project words beyond the context in
which we normally use them, stringing them together in pun or double-entendre.
There is enjoyment in the mastery of the technique, to use Wittgenstein’s phrase (PI
§199). But there is something about the satisfaction of a joke that is not present in a
metaphor, or a secret language, or for that matter in the surprising reversal of fate
that constitutes tragedy. The particular patterns of subversion and change that take
place in a joke are funny, and our response is laughter.
The surprise or tension-release of the joke involves the recognition of a change of
aspect. Wittgenstein’s exploration of seeing-aspects, and in particular the changing
or dawning of an aspect, is important for us. This experience may involve the same
kind of stillness and concentration that Findlay describes in aesthetic experience.
We experience the dawning of an aspect  as something that  happens to us,  as  a
change that takes place. Yet when we are asked to explain it, any sort of explanation
that  is  external  (e.g.,  that  it  is  the  object,  the  picture  of  the  duck-rabbit,  that
changes) seems nonsensically and needlessly mechanical.  [29] The drawing, the
marks on paper, remains the same; it is the viewer’s “take” on it that changes. So it
is with the getting of a joke. Not only that, but the surprise of the joke depends on
the hearer seeing it as, so to speak, a duck and then a rabbit. A hearer who instantly
recognizes the joke as a  duck-rabbit  (who has heard it  before,  or  who sees the
inevitable punch line looming, or who has had it explained) will miss something, as
will a hearer who cannot see the rabbit-aspect dawn at all in place of the duck. As
the  duck-rabbit  is  “half  visual  experience,  half  thought”  (II  xi,  p.197),  so  the
appreciation of a joke is part receptive (indeed passive) aural experience and part
thought, or active connecting.
How do we explain why the dawnings of some aspects are funny and others are not
(just as some are aesthetic and some not)? Perhaps it is linked to the particular rules
or grammar of a joking language game, or perhaps it is the particular balance of
surprise and expectation. But also, just as we all know what it is to kill a good joke,
we  should  beware  of  Wittgenstein’s  ominous  comment  that  “here  we  are  in
enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions” (II xi, p. 200).
Let us take one more risk. Wittgenstein emphasizes the role of giving reasons in
thinking about art. As G. E. Moore reports, he claimed that reasons in aesthetics are
“of  the nature  of  further  descriptions”,  and that  what  they do is  “to  draw your
attention  to  a  thing”,  to  “place  things  side  by  side”.  [30]  In  explaining  this,
Wittgenstein  used  the  analogy  of  a  discussion  in  a  court  of  law,  where  the
presentation  of  relevant  cases  and  precedents  can  lead  the  judge  to  a  new
conclusion.  In  exploring our  analogy we have employed this  method ourselves.
This sort of setting things side by side, when it is adequately done, can bring a
viewer to a greater appreciation of a work of art. It can similarly being a deeper
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appreciation of a joke. But can it bring a laugh? In a sense it is the key to it. When
cases are lined up similarity for similarity, and then shown to be total contraries, we
laugh—for logic had us in its grasp, and suddenly set us free. Laughter rejoices in
its own reasoning power, and its transcendence of it.
We have  used  Wittgensteinian  accounts  of  language  games,  seeing  aspects  and
giving reasons to strengthen our account of the analogy between getting jokes and
appreciating art. It is for many good reasons that the analogy is close enough to be
illuminating. Both activities are touchstones of worthiness in human lives. At their
best  they  invite  us  to  enjoy  our  common capacity  for  creating  and for  making
meaning, and to find in the endeavour shared abilities and values. [31]
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